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RESUMO
As redes são utilizadas cada vez mais para o alcance de bens públicos. Contu-
do, pouco se sabe sobre os elementos que compõem a sua governança. Nesse 
sentido, o presente artigo tem como objetivo discutir quais são as variáveis 
que compõem a governança das redes colaborativas; como elas interagem; 
e porque são relevantes. Os resultados apontam para um modelo analítico 
em que a governança é composta pelos antecedentes à formação das redes, 
pela existência de princípios compartilhados e operacionalizada pelos seus 
componentes processual, estrutural e relacional. Tendo a confiança como ele-
mento transversal da sua evolução e aprendizado, objetivando o alcance do 
resultado esperado. 
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ABSTRACT
Networks are increasingly used for a range of public benefits. However, little is 
known about the elements that constitute their governance. The present article aims 
to discuss the variables that constitute the governance of collaborative networks; 
how they interact; and why they are relevant. The results point to an analytical model 
in which governance is composed of the elements that exist prior to the formation 
of the networks, the existence of shared principles and operationalized by their 
procedural, structural, and relational components. Confidence is the overarching 
element needed for its development and learning, with the aim of achieving the 
expected result.
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INTRODUCTION 
Increasingly frequent partnerships and 
networks among governments, civil soci-
ety organizations, companies, and other 
organizations are a global phenomenon in 
a context marked by greater social frag-
mentation, complexity, and dynamism. Ac-
cording to Sorensen and Torfing (2007), 
these features are related to the prolifer-
ation of relatively independent public and 
private organizations that seek to repre-
sent multiple actors, with their different 
understandings and identities. These ac-
tors demand solutions based on expertise 
that bring different forms of reasoning, 
procedures, strategies, and institutions to 
the discussion. These aspects necessarily 
lead to greater interaction among them, 
increasing the chance for conflicts, uncer-
tainties, and risks.
It is widely understood in the literature 
that conflicts, uncertainties, and risks are 
endemic to networks and that reducing 
their impact requires the establishment of 
a set of instruments that makes it possible 
to coordinate the actors involved (PARK-
ER, 2007; SØRENSEN and TORFING, 2009; 
PROVAN and LEMAIRE, 2012; ROTH et al., 
2012). However, despite the growth in the 
volume of the literature on network gov-
ernance, referred to here as collaborative 
governance, the content is still highly frag-
mented. In general, research on the subject 
primarily consists of case studies in partic-
ular sectors or is focused on specific con-
stituent elements of collaborative gover-
nance such as participation, effectiveness, 
and democracy, among others (MOLIN 
and MASELLA, 2015).
To fill this gap, Molin and Masella (2015) 
create a model composed of four major 
blocks: the initial conditions; the modes of 
network governance; metagovernance; and 
outcome evaluation. Governance of the 
network itself would be what they term 
metagovernance, defined as “the efforts 
of public authorities in steering networks 
through a different set of rules or other 
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strategies and it represents the way in 
which networks are empirically governed” 
(p. 499). This understanding casts the state 
in the leading role, by reason of its capacity 
to define the legal regulations that govern 
organizations, mediate the dialogue among 
actors, resolve disputes, and define the 
strategic context in which actors must act. 
According to Vangen et al., (2015), however, 
this understanding of the state as the lead-
ing actor in the coordination of networks 
is only one of the possible interpretations 
of the role that the state should play in the 
arrangement. According to Bryson et al., 
(2014), the role of government agencies 
in networks should be that of organizers, 
catalysts, and collaborators, sometimes 
leading, at other times aligning themselves 
or creating alliances, and sometimes even 
staying out of the arrangement, to man-
age the public interest. In other words, the 
state does not necessarily play the leading 
role at all times. In some cases, for exam-
ple, coordination is performed by other 
partners, whereas the state merely opens 
space for the formation of the network but 
does not participate in the implementation 
phase itself (MILAGRES et al., 2017).
Despite the different opinions and con-
siderations concerning the appropriate de-
gree of centralization and state control in 
networks, there is an undeniable increase 
in the number of networks formed among 
governments, civil society, businesses, 
and other organizations. This movement 
is reflected in the greater number of re-
ports and studies of different experienc-
es throughout the world, which justifies a 
broad debate over how to govern this co-
ordination (KLIJN and SKELCHER, 2007). 
To contribute to this discussion, the pres-
ent article aims to discuss and understand 
the elements that should be considered in 
the governance structure of collaborative 
networks. Specifically, it seeks to identify 
the variables that constitute collaborative 
governance. How do they interact? Why 
are they relevant?
In addressing these questions through 
a review of the literature, this study con-
tributes to the literature by presenting a 
framework that considers the academic lit-
erature on the subject published between 
2000 and 2014 in journals in the fields of 
public administration/political science and 
organizational theory indexed in the EB-
SCO database. Moreover, it proposes a 
starting point for public and private sector 
managers who are interested in gaining a 
deeper understanding of the subject and 
may even assist them in their operations.
This article is organized as follows: the 
first section lays out the methodology; sub-
sequently, the bibliographic framework and 
main findings of the research are present-
ed; a discussion of the results follows, with 
a view to creating a model of collabora-
tive governance; then, the article concludes 
with final considerations.
METHODOLOGY
To understand how the topic has 
been discussed over the years, a litera-
ture search was started, focusing on un-
derstanding the essential concepts, their 
components, and the development of this 
topic as a field of study.
The first stage consisted of a search in 
the EBSCO database, exclusively focused 
on articles published in journals related to 
public administration and/or political sci-
ence using the search terms “Governance,” 
“Network,” and “Collaboration.” The 
search was refined to include only com-
GOVERNANÇA COLABORATIVA: A COORDENAÇÃO DAS REDES DE GOVERNANÇA
R. Adm. FACES Journal Belo Horizonte v. 18 n. 3 p. 103-120 jul./set. 2019. ISSN 1984-6975 (online).106
http://dx.doi.org/10.21714/1984-6975FACES2019V18N3ART6846
plete articles published between 2000 and 
2014 in academic journals in the field of 
public administration that noted the topic 
of network governance in the article’s ab-
stract. The search found 1,546 entries that 
matched the criteria described. After dupli-
cates were eliminated, the number fell to 
960 articles.
In the second phase of the study, the 
abstracts were read, and articles were ex-
cluded if they addressed topics unrelated 
to the goals of this study, such as social 
network analysis, non-governmental orga-
nizations (NGOs), public-private partner-
ships (PPPs), political networks, exponen-
tial random graph models (ERGM), and the 
relationship between public administration 
and democracy. At the end of this stage, 57 
articles remained.
A detailed reading of the 57 articles was 
followed by seminars in which the three 
researchers discussed each article, their 
central elements, and the interrelationship 
among them. Several texts were discarded 
as irrelevant during this stage, leaving 42 
articles as the basis for analysis.
The 42 articles chosen were published 
in journals recognized for their quality. A 
complete list of the articles organized by 
journal is shown in Table 1.
During the second year of the survey, 
the same research methodology and cat-
egorization of articles were applied to the 
field of organizational theory. The same cri-
teria were used, and of the 1,328 articles 
initially found, only 52 were added to the 
group analyzed the previous year. A com-
plete list of the articles organized by jour-
nal is shown in Table 2.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the 
selected articles by year. Although no pat-
tern emerges in any of the areas that would 
permit the identification of a trend with re-
gard to the theme, we can observe a great-
er concentration of the articles chosen in 
certain years (2006, 2008, 2009 e 2012). 
The discussions among the three re-
searchers concentrated on systematiza-
tions, analysis, insights, and an analytical 
model of collaborative governance. How-
ever, it is worth noting that although the 
proposal may seem conclusive, it rep-
resents only an inventory of the analytical 
variables on the topic. It makes no claim to 
TABLE 1 – Number of articles by journal – Public Administration
Journal Number of articles
Public Administration Review 15
Public Administration 7
Public Management Review 5
Public Performance & Management Review 4
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 3
The Australian Journal of Public Administration 2
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 1
Urban Studies 1
International Journal of Public Sector Management 1
International Public Management Journal 1
The Innovation Journal: The Public Sector Innovation Journal 1
Administration & Society 1
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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being a definitive discussion of this topic. 
Moreover, the construction of a model is 
always reductive because although it facil-
itates understanding of the phenomenon, 
it is not capable of working out or elab-
orating all possible variations that reality 
presents. If, on the one hand, it focuses on 
ease of understanding, then the model can 
become simplistic; if, on the other hand, it 
attempts to approach the complexity of re-
ality, then it becomes unwieldy and unintel-
ligible. Its construction, therefore, reflects 
one possible reading, specific to the author, 
who chooses a single representation from 
among numerous possibilities of reality. In 
addition, a model is almost always prescrip-
TABLE 2 – Number of articles by journal – Organizational Theory
Journal Number of articles
Strategic Management Journal 13
Academy of Management Review 8
Academy of Management Journal 8
Long Range Planning 7
Journal of Management Studies 5
Organization Science 3
Asia Pacific Journal of Management 2
California Management Review 2
Journal of Management 1
Organization Studies 1
Academy of Management Perspectives 1
Management and Organization Review 1
Source: Prepared by the authors.
FIGURE 1 – Distribution of selected articles by year
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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tive, given that it indicates paths and in-
terpretations; furthermore, its deductions 
typically still lack empirical evidence. The 
latter is an important fact in the world of 
networks in the public sphere.
In this sense, the reader should be 
warned that despite understanding the 
dangers above, the authors of this article, 
in addition to others (examples could in-
clude BRYSON et al., 2006; THOMSON 
and PERRY, 2006; EMERSON et al., 2012), 
venture to present a possible model that 
aims to contribute to the understanding of 
collaborative governance. These systemati-
zations make it possible to empirically test 
the variables listed, reformulate the propo-
sitions set out, and implement them in na-
scent and established networks.
The next section presents the main con-
cepts and findings that served as the basis 
for the construction of the analytical mod-
el proposed.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK –  
COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE
Collaborative governance refers to the 
set of tools that makes it possible to co-
ordinate the actors involved in networks. 
It is also the result of a bargaining process 
among the organizations that participate 
in the network and, consequently, among 
their managers, each considering the ben-
efits of cooperation in achieving collective 
and individual objectives. It includes a set 
of decision-making and control processes 
that make it possible to implement the pol-
icies. It involves the exercise of power and 
authority but, even more so, the exercise 
of influence and negotiation. It sets rules, 
standards, processes, routines, and oth-
er procedures that establish the limits of 
autonomy, the division of responsibilities, 
and the bases for sharing resources and re-
sults, among other aspects related to the 
network’s operation. It employs different 
types of institutions to ensure the coordi-
nation and implementation of the activities 
shared by the partners (ROTH et al., 2012).
This set of formal or informal rules, pro-
cedures, and standards develops over time 
through a process of incremental learning, 
as the actors revise their perception of “the 
problem,” their identities, and the very struc-
ture of governance. In other words, it is a 
changing structure, which can vary with the 
surrounding context and with changes in the 
perceptions of its constituent agents. On the 
other hand, this governance structure also in-
fluences the action of its components.
The complexity of the relationships 
among the actors requires that new pro-
cesses be established to mediate the re-
lations among people and organizations, 
which demands changes in the behavior of 
agents. That is, they may act differently if 
they are acting alone in their organizations. 
Moreover, it requires the use of informa-
tion and communication technology to or-
ganize the information circulating among 
actors and institutions. The availability and 
exchange of information, it is worth not-
ing, are perceived as crucial to the smooth 
functioning of the network. It also requires 
performance management models to mon-
itor the individual and group activities that 
will shape the intended result. This require-
ment makes it necessary to involve peo-
ple who, in addition to bringing resources 
to the network, are skilled in negotiating, 
coordinating, and facilitating processes 
(PARKER, 2007).
Unlike traditional forms of governance, 
collaborative governance involves deci-
sion-making processes that are not nec-
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essarily hierarchical but that promote the 
interaction and empowerment of those 
involved. In this sense, they may be more 
effective, given that this greater involve-
ment ensures not only commitment but 
also better-designed solutions to the prob-
lems faced. From the perspective of the 
state, changes are observed not so much in 
the content of policies as in the manner in 
which they are implemented.
The analysis of the literature leads to 
the conclusion that, in general, the dis-
cussion can be classified into three major 
groups. One group focuses on the prior 
conditions and, specifically, their influence 
in the decision to form networks and the 
impact of this element on the networks’ 
development and structure of governance. 
Another group studies the contractual and 
structural aspects found in the network. 
Finally, another group concentrates on the 
processes and instruments that constitute 
the governance of networks.
PRIOR CONDITIONS
In studies that focus on prior condi-
tions, the discussion addresses the ele-
ments that influence the establishment of 
the network, such as the political and reg-
ulatory aspects. These studies also include 
debates about actors’ perception of their 
level of interdependence, complementar-
ity of resources, and risk-sharing. They 
can also include the prior history among 
members, pre-existing levels of trust and 
conflict, and other factors. Table 3 shows 
these elements and others discussed by 
the authors.
If this conjunction of factors leads to 
the establishment of a network, then it 
becomes necessary to structure the inter-
actions among actors to ensure its func-
tioning. This process includes the network’s 
structure, processes, contract, and other 
intangible elements that constitute a set 
of mechanisms/tools for coordination and 
control (HUXHAM, 2003).
TABLE 3 – Prior conditions
ELEMENT COMPONENTS AUTHORS
Prior Conditions
Political, Legal, Socioeconomic, Envi-
ronmental, Regulatory, and Technological 
Elements Emerson et al. 2012.
Degree of Interdependence and
Complementarity of Resources
Thomson and Perry 2006; Emerson et al. 2012.
Risk-Sharing Cummings and Holmberg 2012
Prior History among Members, Pre-Ex-
isting Levels of Trust and Conflict
Bryson et al. 2006; Thomson and Perry




Degree of Acceptance / Legitimacy Healey 2004; Gonzalez and Healey 2005.
Selection of Partners
Huxham 2003; Saz-Carranza and Vernis 2006; Bi-
erly and Gallagher 2007; Holmberg and Cummings, 
2009; Emerson et al. 2012.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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FORMAL STRUCTURE
With regard to its formal structure, col-
laborative governance is composed of con-
tracts and the definition of its coordination 
structure. Table 4 shows the authors who 
study this issue.
It is known, however, that the establish-
ment of contracts and structure does not, 
in and of itself, guarantee cooperation. To 
these must be added different processes 
that develop through the daily interac-
tions among those involved, through re-
current cycles of renegotiation. They are 
also affected by personal relationships, 
psychological contracts, understandings, 
and informal commitments that develop 
over the course of the network’s evolution 
(THOMSON and PERRY, 2006).
PROCESSES
The processes that constitute col-
laborative governance can be viewed as 
mechanisms developed for the day-to-day 
operation of the networks. They are com-
posed of different tools, such as routines 
that are improvised or deliberate, formal 
or informal, rigid or flexible, permanent 
or transitory. They may arise from agree-
ments established by contract or born of 
necessity to function in an integrated man-
ner. Some argue that they act as mediators 
between contract and performance (NIEL-
SEN, 2010). Others (DOZ, 1996; LARSON, 
1992; RING and VAN DE VEN, 1994) claim 
that as trust and familiarity among actors 
deepen, these mechanisms are refined and 
become very important in the functioning 
of collaborative networks. Table 5 shows 
the processes listed in the literature and 
the authors who discuss them.
The discussion now turns to the ele-
ments found in the literature with the aim 
of creating an analytical model for collab-
orative governance. The authors empha-
size that they recognize the limitations 
of models. Nevertheless, they assume the 
risks and understand them to be part of 
the process of scientific production. In 
other words, the construction of models 
helps empirically test the variables cited, 
reformulate propositions, and implement 
practical applications.
DISCUSSION
Based on the findings in the literature, 
collaborative governance is influenced by 
prior conditions. That is, contextual ele-
ments (EMERSON et al., 2012) influence 
the actors who will compose the network, 
both in their decision to form the network 
and in how it is structured. Thus, aspects 
such as the history of relationships, the ac-
tors’ degree of familiarity with each other 
and with networking (SAZ-CARRANZA, 
2006; THOMSON and PERRY, 2006), the 
existence of leadership and confidence, the 
level of prior conflict, and the perception 
of the interdependence of resources (WE-
BER and KADHEMINA, 2008; EMERSON 
et al. 2012), among others, are aspects to 
be considered in both the decision to form 
a network and the design of its governance.
Once the decision has been made to 
form a network and it has been ascer-
TABLE 4 – Collaborative governance – Structure and Contracts
 Contracts  Aggarwal et al. 2011; Miller and Devers 2012.
Structure Provan and Kenis 2005.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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tained that some principles exist (interde-
pendence, risk-sharing, complementarity 
of resources and common objectives), or 
at least that there is willingness to build 
them, the actual process of structuring 
the collaborative governance begins. This 
process is composed of contractual gov-
ernance, in which the formal elements of 
the partners’ coordination are laid out. The 
contract is one of these formal elements 
and contains rules, standards, and clauses 
that establish boundaries, responsibilities, 
and rights (HUXHAN, 2003; PROVAN and 
KENIS, 2005; BRYSON et al., 2006). The 
coordination structure is another element, 
establishing duties and methods and spec-
ifying who is responsible for managing/co-
ordinating the network (THOMSON and 
PERRY, 2006; AGRANOFF, 2006).
In addition to the contractual aspect, 
there is procedural governance, which in-
cludes the various processes and instru-
ments by which the network’s day-to-day 
operations are managed. Among those dis-
cussed in the literature, several are high-
lighted here: the process establishing how 
communication occurs aims to provide 
informational symmetry, restricting oppor-
tunistic behavior (BRYSON et al., 2006; 
THOMSON and PERRY, 2006; SCHEREIN-
ER et al., 2009; WHELAN, 2011); manage-
ment of the conflicts that occur in any 
network composed of multiple actors with 
different world views and different cultures 
(BRYSON et al., 2006; THOMSON and 
PERRY, 2006; WHELAN, 2011); the evolu-
tion of objectives, which may have coincid-
ed when the network was established but 
may require renegotiation as the network 
matures and the context changes (KALE, 
2006; KOPPENJAN, 2008; MANDELL and 
KEAST, 2008; KLIJN and KOPPENJAN, 
2009; MCGUIRE and SILVIA, 2009; KU-
MAR, 2014); and the decision-making pro-
cess, which may not require unanimity but 
should favor consensus and balance in the 
exercise of authority, as the actors have dif-
ferent degrees of power and status (AGRA-
NOFF, 2006; EMERSON et al., 2012); in this 
sense, it should favor balance and seek to 
TABLE 5 – Collaborative Governance – Processes
Administration
Provan and Kenis 2005; Agranoff 2006; Bryson et al. 2006; Thonson and Perry 2006; Weber and 
Khademian 2008; Schereiner et al. 2009; Emerson et al. 2012; Osborne and Strokosch 2013; 
Kumar 2014.
Leadership
Agranoff and Mcguire 2001; Feldman and Khademian 2002; Saz-Caranza and Vernis 2006; 
Thomson and Perry 2006; Weber and Khademian 2008; Mcguire and Silvia 2009; Whelan 2011; 
Hogg et al. 2012; Shepherd and Meehan 2012.
Mutuality / Construction of 
Legitimacy
Hardy et al. 2003; Kenis and Provan 2006; Thomson and Perry 2006; Emerson et al. 2012; 
Grundinschi et al. 2013.
Confidence-Building  Connelly et al. 2012; Emerson et al. 2012; Oomsels and Bouckaert 2014.
Control and Outcome  
Evaluation
Klijn and Koppenjan 2000; Provan and Milward 2001; Soda et al. 2004; Koka et al. 2006; Saz-Car-
ranza and Vernis 2006; Callahan 2007; Bryson et al. 2006; Koontz and Thomas 2006; Koppenjan 
2008; Lunnan and Haugland 2008; Mandell and  Keast 2008; Provan and Kenis 2008; Weber and 
Khademian 2008; Lindencrona et al. 2009; Mcguire and Silvia 2009; Ness 2009; Sorensen and 
Torfing 2009;
Aggarwal et al. 2011; Whelan, 2011; Kumar 2014; Rahman and Korn 2014.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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establish horizontal relationships among 
the partners (PROVAN and KENIS, 2005).
Based on these aspects, an important 
element that warrants observation is the 
leadership process. As a key element in col-
laborative environments, the influence of 
leadership is felt at all different stages. Be-
fore the network is formed, capable lead-
ers are needed to align interests and agree-
ments, seek out and gain the cooperation 
of necessary partners, and sometimes lend 
their credibility and reputation to create 
the required pre-conditions (BRYSON et 
al., 2006; EMERSON et al., 2012). Through-
out the existence of the network, these 
actors are called on to perform numerous 
ongoing tasks that require a broad range 
of skills and, in particular, an understanding 
that leadership in collaborative environ-
ments is transitory and shared (WEBER 
and KHADEMIAN, 2008; HOGG et al., 
2012; KUMAR, 2014). It derives not from 
hierarchical structures but rather from 
the recognition of skill at solving specific 
problems related to the network’s goals or 
from the ability of leaders to create an en-
vironment that is suited to collaboration. 
They are also responsible for establishing 
the network’s legitimacy, both internally 
with their partners and externally with so-
ciety (BRYSON et al., 2006). It is therefore 
necessary to differentiate among the net-
work leader (who is responsible for creat-
ing an environment in which collaboration 
flourishes), the network manager/coordi-
nator (who is in charge of the operation of 
the various processes), and the network’s 
legal representatives, politicians, or spon-
sors (who support and sometimes lay the 
groundwork for its existence and who, de-
spite having the power to impose decisions, 
refrain from doing so, in recognition of the 
importance and power of solutions arrived 
at jointly among partners) (FELDMAN and 
KHADEMIAN, 2002; THOMSON and PER-
RY, 2006; WEBER and KHADEMIAN, 2008; 
WHELAN, 2011; SHEPHERD and MEE-
HAN, 2012). The leader can take on differ-
ent functions but must be able to differen-
tiate among the roles to be played in each.
Therefore, the complexity of this envi-
ronment requires the presence of a third 
component in the composition of collab-
orative governance, which is relational 
governance. This aspect is composed of a 
set of elements that work with intangibles: 
(1) network identity – shaped by symbolic 
and cognitive elements – statements, signs, 
established and perceived values, codes, 
understandings, and concepts (HARDY et 
al., 2003); (2) psychological contracts – un-
written expectations and assumptions that 
guide the relationship (RING and VAN DE 
VEN, 1994; THONSON and PERRY, 2006); 
(3) the collective vision, which includes the 
objectives to be achieved, motivated by be-
liefs and ideological positions (THOMSON 
and PERRY, 2006; EMERSON et al., 2012; 
GRUNDINSCHI et al., 2013); (4) the sense 
of justice, belonging, and acceptance; and 
(5) the creation of a safe environment in 
which resources, information, and knowl-
edge can be shared (SAZ-CARRANZA 
and VERNIS, 2006).
The separation between relational gov-
ernance and procedural governance has 
nothing to do with any inability to create 
instruments or processes for its construc-
tion and management. On the contrary, a 
more detailed reading of procedural gov-
ernance reveals this intention in its vari-
ous components. Some authors even point 
to the processes of confidence-building 
(BRYSON et al., 2006; KALE, 2009), for 
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example, and focus on understanding how 
these are related to the processes of con-
trol and to the contract (DAS and TENG, 
2001; KRISHNA et al., 2006; FAEMS et al., 
2008; PURANAM and VANNESTE, 2009; 
CONNELLY et al., 2012; MALHOTRA and 
LUMINEAU, 2011). Here, the cut-off crite-
rion concerns the ability of the items that 
constitute relational governance to deci-
sively contribute to the construction of an 
environment in which collaboration occurs 
and to achieving the important goal of gen-
erating a collaborative surplus. This is de-
fined as the actors’ openness to establish-
ing new networks with partners or others. 
The reason is that they realize that this type 
of arrangement contributes to the solution 
of complex problems. In addition, their ex-
perience with past agreements leads them 
to realize that they have become famil-
iar with working collaboratively. In other 
words, they have developed the necessary 
skills for networking because networking 
relies on the development of alternative 
forms of management and coordination. 
This outcome is crucial, given that reaching 
the desired outcomes requires overcoming 
the challenges and learning the details of 
this type of arrangement.
Collaborative surplus and the creation 
of an environment that fosters collabo-
ration are related to the perception that, 
over time, the participants’ interests and 
specific objectives have been respected. 
This is true even if these have been con-
sidered secondary to the network’s objec-
tives. It is the product of consensus-build-
ing, which results from the creation of 
spaces for dialogue in which different views 
and interpretations of the world have been 
discussed and negotiated (THOMSON and 
PERRY, 2006; EMERSON et al., 2012).
The perception of interdependence 
and the importance of each partner’s par-
ticipation, whether in designing solutions, 
producing consensus and common under-
standings or contributing to the network’s 
outcomes, pave the way for creating a feel-
ing of belonging and acceptance. This per-
ception must be fostered and continually 
reinforced. Therefore, spaces for dialogue 
and negotiation must be created in which 
daily accomplishments, regardless of how 
small, are commemorated. Here, leadership 
and constant communication are crucial 
because they diminish opportunistic be-
haviors and mistrust and promote mutual 
trust. It is particularly worth highlighting 
that communication requires not only the 
establishment of formal channels but also, 
even more importantly, the creation of a 
common language, shaped by shared codes, 
understandings, perceptions, and concepts 
(HARDY et al., 2006).
Another important element is the mech-
anisms established for the resolution of con-
flicts, such as processes, standards, rules, and 
contractual clauses (BRYSON et al., 2006). 
The willingness to relinquish personal un-
derstandings and goals is tied to the poten-
tial gains of working in partnership, and it is 
necessary to ensure that all participants feel 
that they are treated fairly (PORRAS et al., 
2004; THOMSON and PERRY, 2006). These 
processes also allow initial expectations to 
be revised, reformulated, and adapted and 
open opportunities for the creation of psy-
chological contracts, which take on an im-
portant role in establishing behaviors.
The development of a collective vision, 
shaped by shared beliefs and ideologies and 
built on ongoing renegotiation, is relevant 
to the creation of an ideal that unites those 
involved. There is also a need to create 
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an environment based on a common and 
shared sense of direction (HARDY et al., 
2006). In this sense, building team spirit is 
essential. This aspect arises from different 
aspects that constitute governance, partic-
ularly from the establishment of an identity, 
in which statements that promote collabo-
ration and established and perceived values 
support the behavior of actors in pursuit of 
the network’s goals.
Permeating the components of relation-
al governance is trust. Trust provides the 
backdrop against which a collaborative en-
vironment can emerge. To that end, there 
must be trust in the reliability and ability of 
partners to perform as expected (SAZ-CA-
RANZA and VERNIS, 2006) that opens 
space for the construction of the imaginary 
and cognitive symbolism that is necessary to 
form psychological contracts and shared vi-
sions (THOMSON and PERRY, 2006).
Many authors argue that trust is crucial 
to collaborative environments because it 
significantly influences the collaborative gov-
ernance established. In the absence of trust, 
for example, formal agreements and con-
tracts play a more important role in both 
control and coordination. Trust also shapes 
the type of coordination structure estab-
lished. As proposed by PROVAN and KEN-
IS (2008), limited trust requires centralized 
networks. With regard to procedural gover-
nance, trust facilitates actors’ performance 
of their day-to-day functions because they 
believe that others will keep their promis-
es, be sufficiently competent to achieve the 
objectives set, and act benevolently when 
contingencies arise. Beyond what is pro-
posed in the literature, the authors add here 
that trust is an important support element, 
forming the background that supports the 
establishment of relational governance.
This is the locus at which contracts, 
structures, processes, and instruments 
converge to support the construction of 
the environment in which collaborative 
work will be performed. The combination 
of elements of contractual and procedural 
governance, supported by the construction 
and reaffirmation of trust, opens space for 
the creation of psychological contracts, be-
liefs, identity, shared vision, etc. The reason 
is that the formation of clear, tangible struc-
tures reduces the uncertainties inherent 
to the coexistence of multiple actors from 
different contexts. Simultaneously, because 
these are formed over time, guided by the 
learning that accumulates as the network 
develops and matures, they are by nature 
incomplete and thus ensure the flexibility 
that is necessary to build an environment 
that is suited to collaboration.
The final group to be considered in the 
proposed model refers to the principles 
that must be observed. These are intan-
gibles that are inherent to the function-
ing of networks: (1) the perception of in-
terdependence – partners join to form a 
network because they recognize that the 
result will be achieved only by combining 
their available resources or they are fully 
aware of their inability to reach their goals 
alone; (2) the convergence of objectives – 
this is the product of recurrent rounds of 
negotiation and is an element that keeps 
the network alive; in its absence, the ar-
rangement crumbles; (3) awareness of au-
tonomy – although they have entered a 
collaborative arrangement, partners are au-
tonomous organizations, with different and 
legitimate interests; and (4) the perception 
of reciprocity – the participants commit to 
the network only if they trust each other 
or suspend their mistrust. In other words, 
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actors will participate in the network only 
if they observe that everyone will act as 
expected (BRYSON et al., 2006; THON-
SON and PERRY, 2006; EMERSON et al., 
2012). These principles will influence and 
be influenced by every development of the 
network, including its governance and out-
comes. This is an interactive cycle in which 
the early stages of the maturation of these 
principles shapes the components of col-
laborative governance; on the other hand, 
they are affected and readjusted by the im-
plementation of these components.
Therefore, collaborative governance 
evolves and emerges gradually, reflecting the 
outcome of an ongoing process of learn-
ing-by-doing that originates with the actors’ 
fluid perceptions of problems and solutions 
as well as of themselves and their partners.
It is worth emphasizing, however, that 
the balance among the three components 
of governance – contractual, procedural, 
and relational – is crucial, not trivial. A gov-
ernance that heavily relies on the contrac-
tual aspect, which may result from unfavor-
able prior conditions such as a past history 
of conflicts and distrust, may translate into 
control-laden processes and, consequently, 
inhibit the flourishing of trust and a col-
laborative environment. Highly centralized, 
self-sufficient, and autonomous structures 
may limit the participation of partners and, 
as a result, fail to create spaces for the 
emergence of principles based on collabo-
ration, such as participants’ commitment to 
defining and executing tasks. Rigid process-
es can hinder the establishment of a col-
laborative environment and, consequently, 
the achievement of the expected results. 
This can occur when such processes are 
unable to keep pace with the development 
of psychological contracts, renegotiation 
FIGURE 2 – Analytical Model of Collaborative Governance
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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along the way, and the production of new 
consensus and understandings. Examples of 
rigid processes include the establishment 
of strictly defined outcomes that merely 
define goals without considering the route 
taken to achieve them and bureaucratic 
communication processes that ignore the 
importance of uniform access and com-
partmentalize information.
On the other hand, loosely defined pro-
cesses can lead to lack of commitment. 
That is, if they perceive that contributions 
are not being measured, partners dedicate 
less time to the network. Worse yet, they 
may feel disadvantaged, which damages 
their perception of fairness. Inadequate 
control systems may cause mistakes to be 
overlooked and go uncorrected, leading to 
a loss of the network’s internal and exter-
nal legitimacy. In other words, balance is 
crucial. In addition, because networks are 
arrangements that develop gradually and 
operate in a changing environment, open-
ness and flexibility to analyze and adapt to 
indicators along the way are important.
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
As society changes and different para-
digms take hold, the state faces new challeng-
es. Currently, the limits of the state’s perfor-
mance are being debated again. Many argue 
that the state is unable to solve a number of 
problems of contemporary society. Although 
this debate is not new, having been the center 
of discussion in various eras, some nuances 
warrant being highlighted.
We have observed a growing number of 
studies that seek to understand how collab-
orative strategies can respond to complex 
problems in contemporary society. These 
studies indicate several points, among 
which is the fact that networking cannot be 
viewed as a panacea, a solution applicable to 
all cases. Instead, some specific details must 
be observed, such as prior conditions that 
are favorable or unfavorable to the viability 
of network formation. Others believe that 
certain areas of state activity, such as tax-
ation, do not lend themselves to the for-
mation of networks (TORFING, 2012). An 
analytical overview of these studies, how-
ever, allows us to assert that no definitive 
evidence exists proving that this method is 
more effective or ensures the best results. 
We still lack comparative studies, consen-
sus among the various concepts applied, 
and data that permit the generalization of 
results, conclusions, etc. Nevertheless, one 
can say that the governance structure is a 
central feature of a network, recognized as 
influencing the network’s ability to achieve 
the objectives established.
This justifies greater commitment from 
public administrators to understanding the 
operation of these networks, particularly 
their governance structure. To contribute 
to this understanding, we list some points 
that warrant attention.
EVIDENCE FOR PRACTICE
1) An understanding of the specific de-
tails of a network’s governance significantly 
contributes to achieving the desired re-
sults. Particularly in relation to outcomes, 
attention should be paid to broadening the 
customarily used indicators. It is important 
to go beyond monitoring and measuring 
the specific objectives established by a net-
work to assess how the outcomes match 
the interests of different stakeholders, their 
level of satisfaction, and their involvement 
with those who directly participate in the 
network’s governance.
2) Contrary to popular assumption, the 
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relations in collaborative environments 
are marked by conflict, making the promo-
tion of a collaborative environment crucial 
because this affects whether the desired 
results will be achieved. Therefore, it is 
important to establish criteria by which 
intermediate results and the network’s in-
tangible elements can be measured. In oth-
er words, it is important to assess the net-
work’s capacity to generate collaborative 
surplus and the political costs involved.
3) It is worth considering that although 
many advocate the establishment of net-
works involving civil society as a means of 
promoting the democratization of relations 
between governments and citizens, there is 
neither consensus nor empirical evidence to 
support this view. More recent studies even 
point to cases that contradict this state-
ment. They claim that relations have not 
changed but rather that power has shifted 
from traditional government forums to the 
arena of the network. According to this evi-
dence, politicians have taken over this space 
as an arena for promoting individual agendas 
(BLOCK and PAREDIS 2013).
4) However, if it is true that the state 
tends to use collaborative networks to de-
liver certain public goods and services, it is 
crucial that it understand the intricacies of 
governance. Therefore, it is important that 
the accumulated learning dispersed among 
different branches of government be stored. 
This makes it necessary to systematize and 
organize the information and experiences 
of the different branches of government in-
volved in collaborative networks. Thus, in-
formation about partners, records of past 
experience, and the ability to read the con-
text can help determine where, when, how, 
and why to form networks. The wording of 
contracts, the analysis of what, when, and 
under which circumstances structures are 
most appropriate, the design of process-
es and instruments, and the recording and 
analysis of the elements that constitute re-
lational governance can facilitate the expe-
rience, learning, and improvement of future 
network experiences.
As noted above, networks are perceived 
as arrangements that favor horizontal rela-
tionships, in which hierarchy is replaced by 
the search for consensus and shared lead-
ership. However, the state is an institution 
whose power and status do not lend them-
selves to breaking with hierarchy. In addi-
tion, many government agencies are highly 
bureaucratic and politicized. Therefore, the 
following question may be asked: how can 
expectations of more horizontal relation-
ships be reconciled with structures that bear 
these characteristics? In addition, leadership 
in a network is viewed as transitory and 
shared. Are public administrators trained 
to work in contexts with these character-
istics? If leadership is transitory and based 
on knowledge and skills that are specific to 
solving the various problems that arise over 
the network’s life, then what should the at-
titude and actions of state representatives 
be? The answers to these questions were 
not the goal of this study and may not yet be 
formulated. This is a point that warrants the 
attention of public administrators involved 
in networks and indicates an important di-
rection for future studies.
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